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F. nk. .Juno 
FHANK ::\iO 
and Loan Commissimwr, 
Ill Building and Loan Associations--Action~---Pleading. 
an aetiou to ~Pt asidP salt>;; of ,•ertilli·ate,c or a 
and loan association to its eontrol or tht• wn rkPt 
!'or its securities and ! hen' :1 t l<·ss than face 
value, failed to stat<> faets suffieirnt to ~upport a eonelusiuu 
that the wert• void. wiH·n· sw:h wen• JllH!lJ-
[estly not themselves eontnwts of wai1·t'r and y,,jd as su,.h 
within Building uud Loan :\ssm·iati,m 
to h,; eontracts of wain·r, :lnd wli<•t·c·, if 
lawful use of the as~o('iatiou's funds, st11·h us,•, uml•·r ~ 14.11/, 
did not render the pnrehnses inv,did. 
[2] !d.-Certificates-Rights of Purchasers. --1'tirthasl·rs of build-
ing and loan association certifieates did not have a contractual 
right precluding the Legislainr·e l'rolll ;;ub-
sequent to the purchases, in tlw f'il'Pet of a violation of 
the Building and Loan Association Act au as~oeiation, where 
Const., art. XII, ~ 1, in effect at the date of the purchases, 
provided that all present and future laws concerning corpora-
tions might be altered or rt'pealed. 
[3a-3d] Id.-Actions-Pleading.--~}ut of l'onn•·r building· 
and loan association certificate holders fails to allege facts 
entitling him to rescission of the sa!Ps of their cer-
tificates to the association for less than face Yalue, where no 
restoration or offer to restore the sale price was made, and 
where, the face value not representing an undisputed amount 
due the assignors, they are not entitled to retain such price 
and still have the sales rescinded. 
[4] Cancellation-Judgment-Relief Granted.-- Sine<' tlw ohjedi ~-,, 
in equity is to place in his former position, 
the collectibility of a dPht or judgment has no on the 
amount recoverable. 
[51 Building and Loan Associations-Actions-~ Pleading. ,\ u a~­
signee of former building and loan assoeiation certificate hold-
ers fails to state a eause of action for damages resulting from 
the association's conduct in its outstanding eertifi-
See 4 Cal.Jur. 644; 9 Am.Jur. 160. 
McK. Dig. References: :3, fi] Building and Loan Assoeiatious, 





of reseission would have been. 
I 6] Id.~Certificates-Relationship to Certificate Holders.-~-Thert' 





Court of the 
Edward P. 
Af•tion to set asidP sales of certificates of building and loan 
association to association and for reinstatement of sellers as 
r<~rtifieate holders, or for ,Judgment for defendants 
on sustaiHing drnmrrer to complaint without leave to amend, 
affirm eel. 
1\l orse Erskine, Erskine & 
Tnlley and liJrskine, & 'rullPy; for Appellant. 
Sullivan, Hoche, ,Johnson & Ji'arraher and James F'arraher 
for Re;;pondents. 
l:)JIENJC ,J .---The plaintiff sued as the assignee of 250 for-
nJer inwstlmmt lcrrtifieatP holders of Pacific States Savings 
nnd [,oan Company to set aside the sales of their certificates 
and for reinstatement as eertificate holders, or for damages. 
The aetion is based on alleged illegal acts and fraud of the 
defendant corporation. The Building and Loan Commissioner 
of the state was joined as a defendant. A judgment was 
entered m1 an order sustaining the defendants' demurrer to 
pl11intiffs' amended enmplaint -without leave to amend. The 
plaintiff appeal(~d. 
This is tlw F<er•oll(l app<'ai in tlw ease. rrhe first appeal also 
m;,; by thP plaintiff from a jndgmPnt entered on an order 
:.>llNtai ning- the defendants' r1emnrrer to the original com-
plnint without leave to amend. That judgment was reversed 
on the ground that leave to amend should have been granted. 
(King v. J1Iortinuw (Jan. 1948), 83 Cal.App.2d 153 [188 P.2d 
fl02] .) 
The amended complaint 1vas filed on April 27, 1948. That 
pleac1ing and the f1ecisiom; in prior rases involving the affairs 
of Pacific States Saviugs and J_,oan Company (herein also 
the historical 
to 1 he action. States Sav. & L. 
Co. Y. Hlsc, 2:5 Cal.2d 822 [ 155 P.2d 809, 138 A.IdL 
Kinu Stales Sav. deL. Co .. 26 Ca1.2d 33a [158 P.2d 
as a bnilding and loan assoeia-
of the association continued in 
flnancial condition until 1 when dne to the world-sdde 
Peonomi<· its af1'airs became involved the neecs-
to foreelosc 011 real property holdings and because of 
excess rlemands for withdrawals by investors. On March 4, 
1 !la9, the Building and r,oan Commissioner took possession 
of the assoeiation 's property, bu~incss and assets. [1] It is 
alleged that beginning in 1931 to the date of the commis-
~ioner 's possession, the association through its agents engaged 
in a eom·se of conduct designed to acquire outstanding invest-
ment eertifieates at Jess than their faee value; that it com-
meneed the sale of foreclosed properties to acquire funds for 
that purpose; that there was a market for its investment 
eertiflcati~S by reason of the fact that holders ·were offering 
their certificates for sale and that they were being purehac;ed; 
that the association had the power to and did within limits 
eontrol tl1e bid prices for the investment certificates although 
it eonld not fix prices so low that holders would not be induced 
to a(~eept the priecs offpred; that the association was always 
able to fix priees on the market at substantially less than the 
faee amonni. 'l'he association purchased investment certifi-
eates aggregatiug $26 .. 500,000 face value for approximately 
$17,500,000, representing a difference of approximately 
$9,000,000 behreen the faee amount of the certificates and 
the amount for which they were purchased. The plaintiff's 
assignors in the present action represent and seek to recover 
$690,646.78 of that difference. 'l.'he action was commenced on 
October ] 8, 1D48. It will be assumed that the present com-
plaint sufficiently iudieates that elaims for the amount sought 
were theretofore (luly presented to t lw Building and Lnan 
CommiRsioner and were rejected. 
The original complaint \vas framed to recover the stated 
difference on the theory that the alleged course of conduct 
rendered the purchases by the association illegal and void. 
In holding on the prior appeal that the plaintiff should have 
been permitted to amend, the District Court of Appeal said: 
"It must be coneeded that the complaint does not plead suffi-
cient facts upon which the transactions eomplained of could 
,j llllf' 19511 KI'\O 1'. MoRTL\IER 
137 C.2d 430; 233 P.2d 41 
be held void.· After mentioning the former case of King v. 
States 8av. (f; L. 26 Cal.2d 333) the court 
continued : ''The case we have here is also founded upon 
d1arg·es of frau<1. Unless the plaintiff can amend his com-
to show affirmatively wherein the contracts involved 
WET(' void and not Yoidable, we must assume that if the 
(·nn recover at all it must be on the theory that the 
transactions of were voidable because of the 
franduknt which brought them about. 
On this become necessary for him to rescind 
the trammetiom; and restore everything of value ·which he 
had or to plead facts showing that plaintiff's as-
signors were entitled in any event to retain what they had 
rrcciYcd,'' citing section 1691 of the Civil Code. 
'rhe ailH'lHled complaint was an attempt to comply with 
the dE'rlarccl requirements. The questions to be determined 
are whether the complaint as amended contains allegations 
of fact sufficient to support a conclusion that the transactions 
\\'ere Yoid; and if not, whether the plaintiff has brought him-
self within the provisions of section 1691 of the Civil Code 
by alleging restoration of or offer to restore benefits received, 
or faets showing the right to retain them in any event. The 
plaintiff has also added alleged causes for the alternative 
relief in damages in the event he has failed in the other 
respects. (See Bancroft v. lVoodwanl, 183 Cal. 99, 102 [l!JO 
P. 44:5].) 
The plai11tiff eontencls that the fads alleged in the amended 
(·omplaint sho"· a violation of seetion 6.02 of the Building and 
f1oan Assoeiation Aet as in effeet during the times involved 
( Stats. 1931, p. 483; 193>l, pp. 309, 1098, 1101; 1935, p. 800; 
1 Deering's Gen. IJa\Ys, ~i..et 986.) 'I' he section placed limitations 
on inwstors' withdrmYals of fun(ls by defining matured with-
drawal (']aims (see seetion 6.01 for requirements to file notie(' 
of intention to withdraw by certifieate holders), preferrer1 
('IHims. Hnrl "frer money"; by stating when available funds 
are free money, ·when an association is on notiee, or on a pro 
rata basis and b;~' regulating when free money may be used 
and for what purpos<'. It is elaimed that the alleged use of 
assoc·iatiou fnnds was eontrary to that seetio11 and >vas also 
prohibite(1 by seetiolls 9.01 and 9.02 which reg-ulated the in-
nostments H]l(1 loans that the association might make. 
S('etiou (i.O:! prohibited the assoeiation from making a eon-
tract \Yaiving the provisions of the seetion and provided that 
an:v such eontraet should be null and void. Seetion 14.0;) 
43-1 KIXG 
dedared the wilful 
be punishable as a criminal offense. Section 14.07 stated that 
as ''otherwise in this 
lation of any of the 
any 
note, trust or other instrument.'' 
'l'he argues that the 
were yoid as contracts of wai.-er. 
sought to be avoided >Yere themselves not 
of the prodsions of section 6.02. were 
eertificates on an admitted open market. 
\vaivcr are alleged. Thus the transactions 11eitlwr con-
tracts of waiYer nor to such contracts. 
If the purchases on the market were to the act 
as unlawful use of association it may be assumed that 
they 'Sere violatious but, pursuant to section 14.07, 
not thereby rendered inyalid. That expreRs 
against irr\'alidity of the unlawful acts the 
tion of the general rule relied on by the plaintiff that when a 
statute prohibits or attaches a penalty to the of an 
act, the aet is \'Oid. Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262 
[191 P. 141; Stevens v. Boyes llot Springs Co., 113 Cal.App. 
479, 482-484 [298 P. 508], for statement of the general rnle.) 
[2] The aet of 1931 was a eontinuation of law 
( § 14.08) with additions including clauses ( 14.04). 
'l'he plaintiff eontell(1s that sinee section 14.07 was an addition 
in 1931 and therefore was not the lmv at the time the a"''"t;uv 
became investors so we shall assume), it should not apply. 
He thereby invokes another general rule, namely, that the pro-
Yisions of the law in force at the time the eontraet was made 
constitute a part of the contract. He argues that the addi-
tion of Reetion 14.07 in 1931 was a material 
which would unconRtitutionally affect 
contraetual rights (U. S. Const., art. I, § 
sary to consider ·what weight this argument 
were directed to purehases of assignors' certifieates 
prior to August 14, 1981, the effectiw elate of section 14.07. 
?\one of the alleged transfE'rs \HiS rnade to that date. 
·when the assignors became investors section 1 of article 
XII of the state Constitution provided that all laws concerning 
corporations and all such future Ja·ws might be altered from 
time to time or repealed. Thus it was not a contractual right 
of inyestors that the Legif>lature could not make subsequent 
ehange in the legal effect of a future violation of the aet 
that the 
if unlawful acts of such associa-
I t was for the to 
proper ease the investor should be 
of reseission Tt follows that 
not facts sufiicient to 
eond nsion tl1at the transactions were void. 
[3a] 'l'he next is whether the plaintiff has sufii-
thl' to the equitable remedy of rescis-
sion; or, in the alternatixe, th1; right to recover damages. 
P ttrsmmt to section 1691 of the Civil Code the assignors' 
was i'l l'l'scind npon discovery of the alleged 
frn nil and to restore or offer to restore everything of value 
n•et•iYed under the contraet sought to be rescinrled. namely, 
tlh~ for their certificates. 
Bven if it he assumed that the alleged notices of rescission 
\n•re suft1cient from a standpoint of intention and timeliness, 
yet ther<' ·was neitlwr a restoration of nor an offer 
to restore the amounts reeeiyed on the sale of the eertifieates. 
'l'ht• plaintiff contends that the assignors are entitlrd to retain 
i11 any event the amonnts they recriver1 on the sales. This 
~~ontention may be deemed correct only if under the alleged 
alternative cause the measure of the damf!ges is the difference 
hetvrE'en what the assignors received and the face amount of 
tl1e certificates. Por if what the assignors received on the 
sale of their eertifleates was part of an undisputed larger 
elai m or (1rbt then that measure would control at law, 
alld in would determine the right to retain the benefits 
re<:cive1l. (Gilson Q. llf. Go. v. 47 Cal. 597; Westerfeld 
1 Ifew York Ins. 129 Cal. 68 P. 92, 61 P. 667]; 
J!fattcson v. 147 Cal. 739 [82 P. 436]; Taylor v. 
lfoppe1·, 207 Cal. 102, 105 P. 9!JO]; ,~faclsrwe v. Pozzo, 
~6 CaL2d 815 f161 P.2d 449] .) 
'l'o snbstantiate his contention that there was an nndisputerl 
daim then due in the face amount of the certificates sold, 
the plaintiff looks only to the face amount of the certificates. 
lfl" likens the face amount to an unpaid judgment for the 
43El C.2d 
J'(•('(J\'Pl',Y snm nf mo!Jf'.\' and that the 
}l0Sf'ible J of nw (lf;SOdation at tlw tJJllC thf' U•'>'H"''''V' 
,.;old for Ius>< i han tlw amount "dur" doPs not affect the meas-
ure of the damages n~eoverable on aeeount of the fraud. 
[ 4] Sillce t lH• in l'iluity is to place the reseinding 
party in his former the of a debt or 
judgment has no bearing on the amount recoycrable. ( 
bell v. Birch, 19 Cal.2d ID0-798 [122 P.2d ; Bank 
Ltwcrica Y. D8 Cal.App.2d ;J05-
;J()(j [21H P.2d tll4].) [3b] Here it is true that the condition 
of the assoeiation and the measure of the damages are unre-
lated, but it does not follow that the correct measure is the 
one invoked. The fallacy in the plaintiff's argument is the 
assumption that at the time of the sale of the certificates 
there vYas an undisputed claim due in the face amount of the 
certificates or in any amount. The situation might have been 
vomparable to the eases relied on involving fraudulent settle-
ment of existing judgments, if the assignors had matured 
claims for withdrawal in the amounts of their certificates and 
they vYere by fraud indueed to take less. Contrary to the 
plaintiff's assumption hmYeYer the complaint fails to show 
that there \Yas any matured claim or debt due to the assignors 
from the association at the time they sold their certificates. 
lu the final analysis neither the alleged cause for rescis-
sion nor that for damages may be premised on an assumption 
that the certificates had an undisputed value in the face 
amount. The pleading discloses the UlHJnestionable fact of 
the existence of an open market for the inYestors' certificates; 
that clue to association losses sustained by necessary real prop-
erty foreclosures, and the insolYeney or threatened insolvency 
of thr association becam;e of the widespread economic condi-
tions whieh materially depressed values generally, the sale 
value of the certificates offered in the open market was also 
affected. The plaintiff's assignors sold in this adverse market. 
'l'herefore the only measure of their damages is that provided 
by seetion 3343 of the Civil Code, namely, the difference 
between the priee at which they sold and any greater amount 
which the market would have brought save for the alleged 
fraudulent conduct of the association. No facts in this con-
Heetion are alleged or relied on. 
It must follO\v that the plaintiff has not shown suf:fieient 
facts to support a recovery on either of the alternatiYe grounds. 
[5] ~\s to damages. the material facts by which the proper 
measnrr may be applied are lacking. The onl)• mrasnre offere<l 
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that if the assignors had not 
alleged fraud to sell their certificates 
had retained them, they >vould have been paid during 
the full amount of their certificates; that therefore 
were in the amount of the difference between 
fae0 amount and the amount paid, or $690,646.78. All 
hat the plaintiff is is what might have been, had reseis-
sion been [3c] As to the facts 
do not disclose the assignors' right to retain the con-
sideration reeeiYecl on the sale of their eertificates am! at the 
same time be reinstate(l in the position of the investors who 
retained their eertifieates pending liquiclation and eventually 
participated in the inereased values of the assodation 's assets 
following the second -world war. It 'vould be impossible now 
to eomputr what the outcome would have been had liquidation 
proceeded with the assignors in the position of continuing 
<·eriifieatr holders pursuant to an accomplished rescission. It 
\Ymlld also be highly inequitable at this stage of the proceed-
ings, nearly 20 years after the alleged activities, for the court 
to make unprecedented exceptions to the rules applicable in 
resrission by permitting the assignors to share in property and 
assets in the preservation of which they declined to continue 
their ~;npport by failing to comply with equitable requirements 
at the time of their attempted rescission. The court may not 
ihns secure for tl1em a continuing choice to be out or in, de-
pending on whether the fortunes of economics took a tnrn for 
\\·orse or better. To do RO would be in effeet to treat the 
all egrd salrs as void rather than voidable, a result express I.'· 
prohibitN1 by the statute. 
[6] Nor is there gTonnd for extending relief on the basi8 
that a fiduciary rrlationflhip existed between the association 
and the certificate holders. There is nothing in the invest-
ment contract, in the statute, or in the facts alleged indicating 
the ereation of that relationship. No ease so holding is cited 
<1ml the treatment in pertinent cases is a recognition that the 
rrlation is that of debtor and creditor. (See In re Pacific 
(' oast Bldg.-Loan Assn., ] 5 Cal.2d 134 [99 P .2d 251] ; Bnrean 
\Yelfare, etc. Assn. v. Drapeau, 21 Cal.App.2d 138, 146 
f 68 P.2d 9981 : Zottarelli v. Pacific States Sav. & L. Co. 94 
Cal.App.2d 480. 502 [211 P.2d 23] .) The duties and obli-
gatimls of the association are set forth in the statute; the 
statute provides what penalties shall follow from violations 




which were held 
cient statement of a triable cause. 
the conclusion that such 
is affirmed. 
Gibson, 0. and 
Spence, J concurred. 
OAH'l'ER, J.-I dissent. 
I am of the opinion that plaintiff's amended 
stated a cause of action for fraud and that the demurrer 
thereto should not have been sustained. 
As I pointed out in my dissent in King v. Pacific States 
Sav. & L. Co., 26 Oal.2d 333 [158 P.2d 561], the evidence 
produced in that case was more than sufficient to show fraudu-
lent conduct on the part of Pacific States in buying the certifi-
cates held by various investors for less than their face valne. 
I also pointed out that the trial court in the case of Pacific 
States Sav. & L. Co. v. llise 25 Oa1.2d 822 [155 P.2d 809, 158 
A.L.R. the of the seizure of Pacific 
States by the Building & I.oan Commissioner was challenged) 
had found that misrepresentation and coercion had been re-
sorted to by Pacific States in the acquisition of its outstanding 
shares. This in the Hisc case, did not disapprove those 
findings but on the contrary found it not necessary to deter-
mine the sufficiency of the evidence on which were based. 
These three cases have their bases on the same set of facts. 
In the second case, K1"ng v. Pacific States Sav. a; L. the 
majority held that there >vas no evidence of either 
actual or to charge. The ma-
jority here, in the tbird case, holds that has .stated no 
cause of nor can he do so. And the facts are the 
same. As I read the majority it appears to be con-
ceded that plaintiff would have stated a cause of action had 
he or his assignors taken the necessary to effect a rescis-
sion-namely, an offer to restore the consideration which had 
to retain that amount. 
to the certificates 
that form is more 
of the District Court of Appeal 
and I ac!opt that por-
wll iel1 refers to Connts 8 and 4: 
counts are based on of fraud and 
difference between the third and fourth 
that a fiduciary re1ationsbip existed 
his and Pacific States. Plaintiff incor-
reference in both counts the proof of claim which, 
to he filed with the commissioner. This states 
that 'the facts in support of Claimant's demands are set forth 
the and exhibits introduced in the case of 
"\Yeslc!f King v. Pacific States & Loan Company," 
~o. 271.000, in the Superior Conrt of the State of California, 
in and for the and County of San Francisco, and in its 
States and Lorm Company v. Evans, 
Court, to which testi-
mony and is hereby made ns thongh set 
forth at length and made a part of this dt>mand; 
'' Ddendants elaim that plaintiff has not allege.d a trne 
lweam;e tb rre was IJO notice of resr.ission and no 
utfcr to restore. 
' 'N o•rrcE OF RESCISSION 
'' TllC only allegation concerning any notice of resCISSIOn 
is llw follmrin g: · Ou or about February 3rd. 1938, plaintiff 
gave Pacifie States written notice as follows: that the last 
HH'ntioned had assigned to him their claims to re-
enver from it said balances of their deposits shown on said 
Exhibit "C"; that plaintiff was demanding payment of the 
la;;;t mcntioneu claims from Pacific States; and that it Pacific 
Statt·s did not pay the last mentioned claims, plnintiff would 
<'OlllllleiWe suit to their payment.' 
'' 'fhis as to other lists of assignors. 
As said in McNeese v. 190 Cal. 402, 405 1213 P. 36] : 
'f t is not necessary that the notice to rescind shall be formal 
nnd ; it is suffieient that notice shall be given to the 
which elearly shows the intention of the person 
440 KING v. :iY10RTLMER C.2d 
to considrr the contract at an end. It ha;.; been 
hrld in other states that the mere 
suffieient disaffirmance of a sale.' 
of an action is a 
''Applying this test, it is obvious that the notice given 
dearly shows the intention of plaintiff to consider the con-
trac:t. that the sale of the certificates for the 
at an end. The notice was sufficient unless 
to ofl'er to restore the 
"\VAS 0PFEH TO RES'I'OHE NECESSARY? 
''This depends upon what the true measure of damages was 
at the time of the sale, for if plaintiff was entitled in any 
event to retain the purchase price, no offer to restore was neces-
sary. 'It is settled by our decisions that one attempting to 
rescind a transaction on the ground of fraud is not required 
to restore that which, in any event, he would be entitled to 
retain. (See 1vlatteson v. lY agoner, 147 CaL 739, 743 [82 
P. 436], and cases there cited.) This is upon the theory that 
the defpndant could not possibly have been injuriously affected 
by the failure to restore, and the plaintiff might be, for he 
might not be able to again collect the amount from the de-
fendant, if it should be so restored to the defendant.' ( Calz:-
fornia etc. Co. Y. 8ch'iappa-Pietra, Hi1 Cal. 732, 740 [91 P. 
593].) 
'' Defenrlants contend that the measure was that set forth 
in section :3343 of tlw Civil Code, namely, the difference be-
tween the a(~tual value of the certificates and the amount paid. 
Plaintiff contends that it is the measure set forth in Campbell 
Y. Birch, 19 Cal.2d 778 [122 P.2d 902], and Bank of America 
v. Orcenbach, 98 Ca1.App.2d 220 [219 P.2d 814], namely, 
the difference betweeu the face value of the certificates and 
the amount paid. Ordinarily, the measure of damages for 
fraud is that set forth in section 3343 of the Civil Code. But 
there is an exception to that rule. Campbell v. Birch, suzJra 
( 19 Cal.2d 778) sets forth that where the claims compromised 
through fraud are not disputed as to their amount, or as to 
their E'xistence, the one defrauded is entitled to their face 
Yalue. In that case, due to fraudulent representations as to 
his lack of financial responsibility, Birch induced Campbell 
to compromise an indebtedness of $9,412.59 including over 
$6,000 of judgments, and to agree to a reduction in the rental 
payments of a five-year lease from $1,000 to $500 per month, 
all for a payment of $6,000. Later, discovering the fraud, 
Campbell sued in fraud and deceit to recover the indebtedness 
including the face value of the judgments, and the accrued 
,June 1951 
rentaL The court 
Kma v. MoRTIMER 
137 C.2d 430; 233 P.2d 
441 
daim the defrauded does not have to prove collectibiJ. 
ity, distinguishing the facts of its case from Westerfeld v. 
Ncu• York Life Ins. Go., 129 Cal. 68 P. 61 P. 667], 
\Vhich held that where the compromised claim was a disputed 
daim, there must be of Tl1e court then 
to the the 
eause of action is one where the 
frauded party is fixed and as fixed and certain 
as if the defrauded party had technically rescinded. Ob-
viously, if no compromise had been made, plaintiff would haw: 
been entitled to a judgment or judgments for the unpaid 
rrnt. The judgment in the present case is exactly in the 
amount the plaintiff would have been entitled to if no com-
promise induced by defendants' fraud, had been negotiated. 
\Vhat other measure of damages would compensate the de-
frauded party under such circumstances? The only way the 
defrauded party can be made whole is to return to him the 
amount to which he admittedly would be entitled had the 
fraudulent compromise not been secured. To urge that the 
defrauded party must show that the undisputed liability was 
in fact collectible in the sense that the defendants were finan-
eially responsible is to bring in a false issue. Courts in 
rendering judgments are not interested in whether the plain-
tiff ran collert the same-they are concerned with the amount 
of the damage suffered. The collectibility of the compromised 
judgments and claims and the collectibility of the present 
judgment, are matters which are entirely beyond the issues 
in this case. \Vhen the plaintiff proved the claims were fixed, 
cleflnite and admitted as to their existence and amount he 
proved they were "collectible" as that term is used in such 
eases.' (P. 793.) 
"Defendants ron tend that on rescission all plaintiff ·would 
br entitled to was a return of the eertificates. If this wer(' 
trnr, then in the Campbell case, all the plaintiff would have 
brrn entitled to was the compromised claims rather than what 
thr conrt held he was entitled to, their face value. Likewise, 
on such a basis, plaintiff in the Bank of America ease woulfl 
have been given baek his judgment only, and not damages in 
its faee value. Here, the claim (the face value of the certifl. 
cates), and its existence could not be disputed. True, the 
question of whether it would be collectible was uncertain, 
but so were the judgments in the Campbell case. Here, the 
relation between the certiflcate holders and defendants was 
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that of creditors and debtors. The amount of the debt was 
the face value of the and their as said in 
the Campbell case, is 'prima facie the difference between the 
amount paid on the compromise and the face amount of the 
fixed and certain claim.' (P. 793.) 
"In Bank of America v. G1'eenbach, S1l]Jra Cal.App.2d 
220), we held that where a creditor had bern inducrd b,\' 
fraud to settle a judgment for less than its full amount, the 
creditor ·was entitled to restoration of the full judgment 
the amount paid) rather than a judgment for the creditor's 
pro rata share of the debtor's assrts at the time of the fraud. 
'There is no authority cited, and no logical argument made, 
that support the conclusion that a creditor, fraudulently in· 
<lnced to enter into a settlrment of his claim upon material 
misrepresentations as to assets, can or should be limited, il1 a 
rescission action, to a judgment for the pro rata share of the 
assets of the debtor as they existed on the date of settlement. 
'rhe cancellation of an agreement of settlement necessaril~· 
has the effect of placing the parties where they were before the 
settlement was made. It is as if the settlement had neYer 
been made. Authorities are legion and uniform to the effect 
that the legal effect of a rescission is to restore both parties to 
their former position as far as possible. ( 3 Pomeroy, Equity 
,Jnr. (5th ed.) 578; 3 Black on Rescission and Cancellation, 
p. 1660, § 700; 15 C .• T.S. p. 767, § 43.) Tl1e authorities also 
agree that, concurrent with the award of rrscission, thr trial 
eonrt may award money damages or order >~neb othrr relirf 
as justice may require. (4 CaLTnr. p. 797, § 29.) In the prr,.:-
rnt ease the court canceled the settlement agreement. T t 
should then haye reinstated the original judgment. The 
amount of that judgment is fixed and certain.' (P. 2R8.) To 
hold otherwise in this case would put a premium on fraud. 
"The mere fact that the debt of Pacific States to the certifi-
t·<ttr holdrr as evidencf'd by the certifirate. was not immediately 
due or payable, does not mah the amonnt of that drht any less 
fixed, definite or admitted. There is nn logical di,;tinction 
between the indebtedness in the Campbell ease and the judg· 
ment in the Bank of America ease, and the certificates in thifl 
ease. Here there were no disputed claims as there were in 
Westerfeld v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra (129 Cal. 68). 
On demurrer we must accept the allegations of the complaint 
as true. It is alleged, among other things, that the Pacific 
States fraudulently deprrssed the market so that it might in· 
dn<'e holdrrs to srll their certificates. If the measure of darn-
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ilw diff(•n•nee lwtw\'('ll thP anww1t rPecivcd and the 
ad.uul valw~ of the eertifieates market 
the defendauts wonld be in the position of saying, in 
,.ffet·t, 'True. we franclulently induced you to sell your certifi-
nt res. hut, as we had sneeeeded in holding their value down 
" liP a1nonnt \\'(' you, there is you can do about 
!1. would be Jll'ofiting their own fraud, and the 
nHil'l would lw standi11g br, permitting them to 
rt'i!Jl tht• hane~>L 'l'he same would be true as to the actual 
y;Jlu,·, ;1;; distinguished from the market value. 
"Thu;-;, tiH· uwaSIIl'l" of damages being· the difference be-
t 1\'<'t·tt tlH' f;wt· valne of the certificates and the amount paid, 
alld the foJ·nwr beiug gnrater than the latter, plaintiff was 
entitlt>d to retain the latter and therefore was not required to 
oll'el' j o n·st ot·c. ·while the testimony and exhibits in Pacific 
Slates Sa1·inus and Loan Company v. Evans, Commissioner, 
r<'fened to in plaintiff's proof of elaim (this case on appeal is 
entitled l'acific States Sat·. d': L Co. v. Hise, supra L25 Cal.2d 
~.~~ j), indi~ate that the !'Ompany vvas insolvent at the time of 
1 IH' ;dleg!•d fraud and that the investment certificates were not 
wortl1 tlwi1· fae!' va!tH', the tlituation is no different from that 
i11 tlw B<lllk of .\.mHil'a case, supra, where the eonrt found 
that if at the time of the fraud all the debtor's assets had 
he<>lt liquidate!l, the $88,030.f:i6 judgment would have brought 
ollly $2D)l00. Nevertheless, it was held that the measure of 
damages wa;; the faee nllue of the judgment. In our ease, 
whether· the (·ertificates ever would be worth their face value 
11as problematical, depending on the manner in whieh the 
•·ompany operated its affairs, and later, on the manner in 
1rhid1 the building and loan commissioner operated them. 
!Iowewr, if at that time, plaintiff proved the fraud, he would 
lw (•Jititled to a judgment for their face value. Nor would 
suelt jndgmeut have placed him in substantially a better posi-
t iou than tile eertificate holders who kept their certificates. 
II" would lm ve been a creditor on a par with them. These 
<·prtifieate~ are 'a type of unsecured note or debenture' (In rc 
Pncijic Coast Bfdg.-Loan .Assn., ];) Cal.2d 134, 141 [99 P.2d 
~iii) ) , and lwm:(· tlH' relationship between the holder and the 
''ompany is that of creditor and debtor. (See Bureau of Wel-
fare, etc. Assn. v. Drapeau, 21 CaLApp.2d 138 [68 P.2d 998] .) 
[f the eompany was actually insolvent, his attempt to collect 
t ht" jwlgment would have forced the commissioner to take 
tlw !'Ontpany over, and he would be paid only a pro rata of 
C.2d 
the 
crt'tifieatf· would have been one 
,ljffel'enee b(•twP<'n the holder and the certificate 
holdrn;. His wonld be due and payable immedi-
If the company ~were a going concern, the certificate 
holders would have to file the necessary notices to enable 
1 hem to withdraw their and wait the period 
for· If the company were this would 
mean as the judgment could not be paid. If the 
eompany \'\'ere not insolvent, there would be sufficient funds 
1o pay both the judgment and the deposits, so that the short 
period which the certificate holders >vould have to wait would 
be only a minor distinction from the position of the judgment 
ereditor. Practically speaking, the latter \vould have no 
advantage over the former. The fact that there was a market 
ntlue for the certificates at the time of the sale does not affect 
the measure of damages. Particularly is this so where as 
alleged here defendants had fraudulently depressed that value. 
To hold that a building and loan company can by manipula-
tion as charged depress the market, frighten the depositors, to 
whom there must necessarily be owed the duty of not misrepre-
senting the status of their deposits, into disposing of their 
(•ertificates at the depressed market value, where, had they 
held on to them, they, like the others who did hold, would 
have received their full face value, and then for the courts 
to refuse to give relief because the holder had been paid that 
market value, would be making a mockery of justice. 
''As to one of the lists of assignors plaintiff alleges that the 
assignments of their certificates were obtained after plaintiff 
had given notice of rescission concerning all the other assignorR 
and after said notices had been ignored and impliedly refused, 
and that it would have been futile to give notice on behalf of 
the later assignors. Under the circumstances of the case, the 
giving of such notice would have been futile and therefore 
unnecessary." (Cal.App.) 224 P.2d 733, 743. 
];'rom the foregoing it is obvious that Counts 3 and 4 of the 
amended complaint allege sufficient facts to state causes of 
action based upon fraud and rescission and the majority opin-
ion departs from settled principles of law in arriving at a 
contrary conclusion. Considering the background of this 
ease, the result reached by the majority is indeed unfortunate 
since the records of this court disclose an orgy of fraudulent 
eonduct on the part of the defendant unparalleled in the his-
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lory of California as a result of which thousands 
inYestors were mulcted out of their life ·while 
to these certificate holders has long been it is a 
and regrettable travesty that it should now be denied. I can-
not stultify my conscience as well as my of 
in such a result. 
I would therefore reverse the 
Apprllant\ for 1l 
l% 1. .J.. yoted for a 
! L. A. Xo. :21141. In Bank. .Tune 19:ll 
HOY 0. WJLLfAMS et al., Hrspondcnts, v. FRANK D. 
MARSHAU; et al., Appellants. 
fl] Vendor and Purchaser-l'raud-Evidence.--In an action based 
on sellers' fraudulent representations as to a ranch, evidf'ncP 
sustains a finding that purchasers were without experience in 
farming citrus groves and had no knowledge thereof or the 
water supply in the valley in which the ranch lay, notwith-
standing evidence that they had lived in an area with a similar 
climate, and that one of them had resided on an apple orchard 
and owned citrus properties in such Ya lley, where they testified 
to being unfamiliar with water conditions and manageme.nt 
of citrus groves in such va.lley, and that the.y did not manage 
the other properties. 
[2] Appeal-Harmless ami Reversible Error-l'ailure to Find on 
Issues.-·-A judgment will not be reversed for failure to make 
an express finding on an issue in the absence of material evi-
dence to support the finding. 
f3] Vendor and Purchaser-Contract-Quantity of Acreage.~ That 
the exact number of acres of citrus trees on a ranch was matt>-
rial to a contract of sale thereof is shown by evidt>nce that a 
seller represented the ranch to contain a specified number of 
~~itrns acres, and that be dPtermined the price hy multiplying 
the citrus acres by a price per acre. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, § 89(1); [2] 
Appeal and Error, § 1706; [3] Vendor and Pnrchaser, ~ 23; [4] 
Vendor and Purchaser, §61; [5] Usages and Customs, ~19; [6] 
Vendor and Purchaser, § 240(3); [7] Equity, § 46; [8] Vendor 
andPurchaser,§82; [9] Fraud. §.'52; [10] Waiver,~ 9; [11] Elec-
tion of Remedies, § 5. 
